The Problem
The Problem
Every autonomous aircraft must continuously answer one question:
Where am I?
At low altitude, that answer must remain available even when GNSS is denied, communications are unavailable, or the environment itself prevents reliable satellite navigation.
Modern autonomous aircraft—including multirotor, fixed-wing, VTOL, loitering munition, cargo, and reconnaissance platforms—require continuous global positioning to complete a mission, not merely local stabilization to remain airborne.
GNSS denial, jamming, and spoofing are no longer exceptional events. They are increasingly treated as expected operating conditions in contested and degraded environments.
The Fundamental Limitation
Any navigation system that ultimately depends on external infrastructure—whether satellite navigation or an operator communication link—shares the same fundamental weakness:
It fails precisely when the mission becomes most demanding.
The Missing Capability
Autonomous aircraft do not need another method to improve GNSS.
They need a navigation source that is:
- onboard
- continuously available
- globally referenced
- independent of satellites
- independent of external communications
A mission-critical navigation system should not depend on infrastructure it cannot control.
The gap is not another enhancement to GNSS. The gap is a true replacement when GNSS cannot be trusted.